September 25, 2026
Hashir Ahsan
Islamabad
The Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan, while issuing an important clarification regarding Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO) and Islamic succession law, held that the right of representation in inheritance is strictly limited to the children of a deceased son or daughter of the propositus. The children of a deceased brother cannot claim a share in the property on the basis of this statutory provision.
A two-member bench comprising Chief Justice Amin-ud-Din Khan and Justice Ali Baqir Najafi rendered this decision while dismissing a petition filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court.
In the detailed judgment, the apex court clarified that under Hanafi jurisprudence of inheritance, distant kindred (Dhawu al-Arham) cannot inherit in the presence of primary heirs.
The judgment stated that in the presence of the living legal heirs—sharers (Ashab al-Furud) and residuaries (‘Asabat)—the children of a deceased brother (nephews) cannot be included in the inheritance. The court held that a specific statutory exception provided in law cannot be extended to other relationships through analogy, deduction, or logic.
Background
The matter pertains to a dispute over Property No. L-15 located in Model Town Extension, Lahore, whose original owner, Ejaz Ahmad Rana, passed away issueless (childless) on December 31, 2018.
The petitioners (legal heirs of the late Javed Iqbal Rana) claimed that they are sons of the deceased brother of the propositus and are entitled to inheritance under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and Mohammedan Law. They submitted that their names were removed from the amended plaint in the trial court without their knowledge, leading to an ex-parte decree being passed.
The petitioners filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for setting aside the ex-parte decree, which was dismissed by the trial court, the Additional District Judge, and subsequently by the Lahore High Court on March 18, 2026.
Against these decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court was approached under Article 175(1)(C)(F) of the Constitution of Pakistan.
Counsel for the petitioners, Mian Muhammad Tahir Advocate, contended that the lower courts failed to consider the Muslim law of inheritance, the petitioners were not granted an opportunity to produce evidence or present their stance, and there was a misreading of the judicial record.
On the other hand, Muzaffar Hussain Advocate represented the respondents, while Research Officer Director Dr. Muhammad Mumtaz provided legal and research assistance to the court.
Examining Section 4 of the Ordinance, the court noted that the legislature used the term “propositus” (the person whose property is being distributed). In the present case, the propositus was Ejaz Ahmad Rana, and his deceased brother was not his son. Therefore, extending this scope to the children of a brother or sister would run contrary to the true intent of the law.
Citing classical Islamic jurisprudence and Hanafi law, the judgment incorporated verses from Surah An-Nisa and a mutually agreed (Muttafaq ‘Alayh) Hadith from Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim: “Give the prescribed shares to those who are entitled to them, and whatever remains goes to the nearest male relative.”
Referring to Al-Quduri’s ‘Mukhtasar al-Quduri’ and Mulla’s ‘Principles of Mahomedan Law’, the court clarified that children of a deceased brother fall under the category of ‘Dhawu al-Arham’ (distant kindred) and are not entitled to inherit in the presence of sharers and residuaries.
On the point of limitation (the prescribed time limit for filing a claim), the court expressed strong displeasure, stating that at the time of the trial court’s decision on May 5, 2023, counsel for the petitioners was present in court; despite this, the application was filed after an inordinate delay in 2025.
Interpreting Sections 3 and 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1908, the court held that no plausible reason for the delay was presented, and the petitioners cannot escape liability merely by stating that they did not personally sign the claim, while their counsel was continuously pursuing the case.
The Federal Constitutional Court held that the petitioners failed to substantiate their case on both procedural and substantive legal grounds. There was no legal error, misuse of jurisdiction, or misreading of record in the decisions of the lower courts. On all these grounds, the apex court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal (FCPLA 172-L/2026) with costs as unmeritorious.